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Chapter 14
The Future of Retirement in Sweden
Annika Sunde´n
In 1998, the Swedish Parliament passed pension legislation that trans-
formed Sweden’s public pension scheme from a pay-as-you-go defined
benefit (DB) plan to a Notional defined contribution (NDC) plan. In
addition, that reform introduced a second-tier defined contribution
(DC) individual accounts plan. The new pension system went into effect
in 1999 and benefits were first paid in 2001. This reform fundamentally
changed the provision of public pension benefits and redefined the benefit
promise. Under the new system, government-provided benefits are closely
linked to contributions and lifetime earnings determine benefits. The
reform also recognized how increased life expectancy influences the sys-
tem’s financial stability, and so it built in an automatic benefit adjustment
process that responds to changes in longevity. The new system also boosted
individual responsibility due to the introduction of a funded individual-
account component. The reform also had implications for the Swedish
occupational (industry-based) employer schemes, and three of the
four occupational plans changed their formats as a result.
In this chapter we discuss the transformation of the Swedish retirement
income system and comment on how it may change the future of retire-
ment. First we outline the reform, and compare it to the system in place
before the reform. Next we explore the reform process, and then discuss
future challenges. A final section offers some lessons for other countries.
The Pre-reform Retirement System in Sweden
The retirement income system in Sweden has long involved two pillars: a
public national pension that covered all individuals; and an occupational
pension system that built on collective bargaining agreements between
labor market players (akin to employer pensions in the USA). The pre-
reform public pension system provided a flat benefit (FP), introduced in
1913, intended to protect old-age income security, and a supplementary
benefit (ATP) introduced in 1960 to provide earnings-related benefits.1
The ATP benefit was based on a worker’s fifteen years of highest earnings;
it also required thirty years of covered earnings for a full benefit; and it
replaced 60 percent of earnings up to a ceiling. The ceiling was approxi-
mately 1½ times the average wage. People with no or very low ATP benefits
received an additional benefit, the pension supplement. Together with the
FP benefit, the pension supplement provided a minimum benefit level
worth approximately 30 percent of the average wage. Earned pension
rights, retiree benefits, and the income ceiling were all indexed to con-
sumer prices. Benefits were taxed as regular income, although low-benefit
retirees received an extra deduction. The normal retirement age was 65,
but the benefit could be taken at age 60 with an actuarial adjustment or
postponed until age 70. A partial retirement benefit allowed older workers
to reduce the number of hours worked and receive a benefit that partially
replaced lost earnings.
The FP and ATP benefits were financed primarily through payroll taxes
levied on employers. Payroll taxes for the FP and ATP systems were 5.86
percent and 13 percent respectively in 1997, and the financing of the FP
benefit was supplemented by general tax revenues. Although pension
rights were earned only up to a ceiling, the payroll tax was levied on all
earnings. The system was pay-as-you-go with partial funding. When the
system was first introduced in 1960, the contribution rate was set so that
the system would build up a surplus to act as a buffer against cyclical
contribution changes and offset an expected decrease in private saving
following the introduction of a universal earnings-related scheme. The
surplus was invested in several so-called ‘buffer’ funds (AP funds). At the
time of the 1998 reform, assets in the buffer funds equaled approximately
five years’ worth of benefit payments. The majority of these reserves (85
percent) were invested in low-risk assets, mainly Swedish government and
housing bonds.
Occupational plans in Sweden included four types of plans for national
government workers; local government workers; white-collar workers, and
blue-collar workers. All told, these covered most workers (90 percent) and
pay benefits worth, on average, 10–15 percent of income. With the excep-
tion of the blue-collar worker plan, Swedish occupational pensions also
replaced a portion of earnings above the public plan benefit ceiling. At the
time of the public pension reform, all four occupational plans were of the
DB variety, and as a rule, benefits were determined by earnings during
the ten-year period before retirement.
The Reform Process
In the early 1990s, projections showed that the system’s buffer funds would
be exhausted within 20–25 years, and contribution rates would have to be
increased dramatically to continue to pay promised benefits. This was
because under the old pay-as-you-go Swedish system, a generous benefit
formula combined with slowing productivity growth produced large pro-
jected system deficits. Pension benefits as well as earned pension rights
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were indexed to prices rather than wages; the lack of a link between
benefits and real wage growth meant that earned pension rights and
benefits rose faster than wages and contributions in times of low or negative
productivity growth. Indeed, the fact that the system targeted benefits to
capped income, and the earnings cap tracked consumer prices, meant that
over time, successively larger fractions of the population earned wages
above the ceiling as real wages grew.
The system also exhibited other problems, including unsystematic and
inequitable relationships between contributions and benefits. One reason
was that contributions were paid on all earnings from age 16 until retire-
ment, whereas benefits were based only on the highest fifteen years of
earnings. This formula thus redistributed income from people with long
working lives and a flat life cycle income (typically low-income workers), to
those with shorter work histories and rising earnings profiles (typically
high-income workers). Finally, there was little incentive to delay retirement
as a result of the benefit formula and the fact that contributions were levied
on all earnings (Sunde´n 2000).
Reform Process. The reform process began in 1991 when Parliament
appointed a committee to review the system and propose reform. The
goal was a financially and politically sustainable system for the long run.
Compared to financial problems predicted for the USA, the problem in
Sweden was even more severe. Projections showed that, with a future real
wage growth of 1.5 percent and unchanged contribution rates, the buffer
funds would be exhausted sometime between 2010 and 2015. To maintain
financial stability, contribution rates would have to rise from 18.86 percent
to about 24 percent by 2015, and continue to rise thereafter. Indeed, the
system was thought to be sustainable only with a real wage growth of 2
percent (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1994).
Broad political consensus was important and the policymakers faced
strong pressures to find a compromise. A first government commission,
in 1990, could not agree on a reform proposal but proposed keeping the
system’s framework unchanged while indexing system parameters to eco-
nomic growth; it also recommended increasing the normal retirement age
and the number of years required for a full pension. Shortly thereafter,
Sweden entered a deep recession and pension reform became a top prior-
ity leading to the appointment of a parliamentary group representative of
all seven parties then in the Parliament.2 The gradual changes suggested by
the previous pension commission were rejected by this new group, which
instead recommended a complete overhaul of the system.
The group ultimately agreed that the several key principles would govern
the new pension system: benefits would be determined by contributions
from lifetime earnings, indexation would be based on the growth of the
contribution base; and benefits at retirement would incorporate changes in
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life expectancy (Palmer 2002). Overall, the outcome was a compromise, in
that it included both pay-as-you-go and DC elements. A DC plan was
favored because it established a close link between contributions and
benefits, and implied a contribution rate that would remain unchanged
in the future. Since payroll taxes were high in Sweden, it was widely
believed that future financial imbalances could not be resolved by add-
itional increases in contribution rates.
The new system also included a small component of funded individual
DC accounts. Though the Social Democrats initially opposed these, the DC
accounts were eventually adopted in exchange for keeping the scale of the
public program unchanged. The conservatives had argued for a decreased
role of the public scheme but they agreed on a contribution rate of 18.5
percent, if individual accounts were added to the system. Parliament finally
passed the legislation in June 1998: the outcome was a NDC plan which is a
plan financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and the Premium Pension plan
which is a funded individual account component.3
How Does the New Swedish Pension System Work?
In the new system, the total mandatory contribution rate is 18.5 percent of
earnings. This is divided into two portions, with 16 percentage points
credited to the notional account, and 2.5 to the Premium Pension. Contri-
butions are split equally between employees and employers; employee
contributions are limited by a ceiling, while the employer’s share is levied
on all earnings.4 Participants earn pension rights from labor income,
benefits from unemployment insurance, and other social insurance pro-
grams, as well as from years spent at home taking care of children, time in
military service, and in education.5 The system also provides a guaranteed
basic benefit, to ensure a minimum standard of living in retirement.
This guaranteed benefit is means-tested and offset by the income
from the NDC component; it is financed by general tax revenues; and it
is conceptually separated from the earnings-related scheme.6 The guaran-
tee is payable from age 65 and the benefit is worth approximately 35
percent of the average wage of a blue-collar worker. Currently, around
30 percent of retirees collect at least some pension income from the
guarantee benefit. The benefit amount is indexed to prices, so real wage
growth will over time reduce the import of this guarantee in total retire-
ment income.
The NDC Component. The key concept in the new Swedish pension system
is the NDC. Under this framework, contributions are recorded in each
worker’s individual record, and the resulting account values represent that
individual’s claims to future pension benefits. But contrary to a
conventional funded DC scheme, annual contributions in the NDC plan
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are used to finance current pension benefit obligations as in any pay-as-you-
go system. Hence, the individual accounts are ‘notional’.
This individual account balance grows over time, by annual contribu-
tions and due to a rate of return credited to the account each year. To link
earned pension rights to workers’ earnings, the rate of return is set equal to
national per capita real wage growth. It is interesting that formulating the
rate of return on the individual accounts was a sticking point in the reform
discussions. Initially, policymakers considered using the change in the total
wage bill as the measure of the rate of return, to ensure the system’s
financial stability. However a competing reform goal was to ensure that
earned pension rights and benefits followed the average wage growth
among the working population, so that relative income growth would
boost pension income irrespective of when people earned their pay during
their lifetimes. It was felt that these goals were best achieved by using per
capita wage growth. Accordingly, to ensure financial stability, policymakers
added an ‘automatic stabilizer’ mechanism that abandons wage indexation
if the stability of the system is threatened.
Under the NDC, retirement ages are flexible: that is, benefits may be
drawn as of age 61. At retirement, annual benefits are calculated by divid-
ing the notional account balance by an annuity divisor. The divisor is
determined by the cohort’s age 65 life expectancy at retirement, and an
imputed real rate of return of 1.6 percent (the expected long-term real
growth rate of the economy assumed by the reformers). Since the annual
pension benefit is equal to the net present value of benefits using a real
interest rate of 1.6, the initial benefit at retirement is higher than if benefits
were adjusted fully for economic growth each year (as long as growth rates
exceed 1.6 percent). The rationale was to provide a relatively high initial
benefit, rather than having an increasing benefit profile after retirement.
The divisor is the same for men and women, which implies that a unisex
mortality table is used. It is fixed at age 65 and no adjustments are made for
cohort changes in life expectancy after age 65. Benefits are also adjusted
each year for inflation. Since the initial benefit calculation already includes
an implicit rate of return (1.6 percent), the post-retirement indexation
takes this into account. For example, if real wage growth were 2 percent
and consumer prices changed by 1 percent, benefits would be adjusted by
1.4 percent. On the other hand, if real wage growth fell below the norm,
benefits would be adjusted by less than inflation. Over a worker’s lifetime,
this type of indexation produces the same result as regular wage indexation
(Palmer 2002).7
Financial Stability. A key goal of the pension reform was to ensure that
the system would be financially stable, even if the system faced adverse
demographic and economic developments. On the other hand, the system
is still a pay-as-you-go program; pension payments are financed by annual
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contributions. Increasing the contribution rate is not a viable option in the
NDC framework, since higher payments automatically boost benefit
promises. Therefore, the buffer funds and the introduction of an
automatic balancing mechanism are crucial for the system’s financial
stability.
Buffer Funds. The buffer funds play an important role in the
implementation of the new pension system. In the short term, these funds
alleviate pressures on the general budget due to the reform. Several
programs previously were financed through payroll taxes (the guarantee
pension, disability pension, and survivor pension) are now financed
through general tax revenues. In order to offset this change, revenue was
transferred to the general budget from the buffer funds in 1999, 2000, and
2001. The amount was equal to a one-time transfer of about one-third of the
balance in the funds.8 The remaining buffer funds are needed to cover
projected deficits in benefit financing in the future, when the baby boom
generation starts to retire. Thus, although the pension reform created a
pension system that is financially stable in the long run, the reform did not
pay for all of the costs of baby boomer retirement.
Since these buffer funds are so important to the system’s financial
stability, the rules regarding their governance and investment have recently
been reevaluated. Currently, fund management practices are similar to
those in Canada (Pozzebon Chapter 13). In the past, the Swedish buffer
funds have been criticized for sacrificing returns in order to achieve polit-
ical goals, and in particular, subsidizing housing. Accordingly, the new
investment rules require that investments be made using risk and return
considerations; economically-targeted investments are disallowed. The
guidelines also allow a larger share to be invested in equities than in the
past (up to 70 percent of the portfolio) and international assets (up to 40
percent of the portfolio may be exposed to currency risk). Members of the
investment boards are appointed by the government and selected on the
basis of financial competence.
Automatic Balancing. Because the system is still a pay-as-you-go system it
remains sensitive to demographic change. In particular, two features in the
design of the system could introduce financial instability: the indexation of
benefits to average wage growth rather than to the growth in the total wage
bill, and the use of fixed divisors in annuity calculations. In particular,
pension rights and retiree benefits grow with per capita earnings, while
contributions are linked to the total wage bill. This makes the system
sensitive to shocks: for instance, a decline in the workforce would
mean that average wages would grow faster than the total wage bill, so, in
turn, benefit payments would grow faster than the contributions financing
them.
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Another reason why financial imbalances might occur has to do with how
the annuity divisor in the NDC is calculated. Annuities are based on a
cohort’s longevity when it reaches age 65, rather than a projection of that
cohort’s life expectancy. Further, the divisors are fixed after that point, and
not adjusted to take into account changes in ex post longevity. If a cohort’s
actual longevity is longer than anticipated, benefit payments to that cohort
will exceed their total contributions.
An automatic balancing mechanism was designed to deal with these two
sources of financial instability without raising taxes. Thus if shortfalls are
projected, per capita wage indexation will be reduced, to bring the system
back in balance. The idea is that this mechanism will work automatically, so
it does not require an explicit action by politicians. The hope was that
protecting the pension system from discretionary changes would minimize
the risk of manipulation for political gain.
Of course, this automatic balancing mechanism still requires that system
financial stability measures can be calculated. Before the reform, the Na-
tional Social Insurance Board (NSIB) traditionally undertook system pro-
jections to set contribution rates. The new pension system also specifies the
financial information that must be reported, including a system income
statement and balance sheet. A balance ratio relating the pension system’s
assets to its liabilities and summarizes its financial status must also be
calculated annually. The balance ratio is defined as follows:
Balance ratio ¼(Capitalized Value of Contributions
þ Buffer Funds)=Pension Liability
System ‘assets’ consist of the capitalized value of contributions and the
current value of the buffer funds. The capitalized value of contributions is
equal to the pension benefits that the annual contributions could finance
in the long run. It is derived by multiplying annual contributions by the
turnover duration, which is the expected average time between when a
contribution is made to the system and when the benefit payment based on
that contribution is made.9 The current turnover duration is approxi-
mately thirty-two years (NSIB 2004). The pension liability is thus the
system’s current vested liability.10 A balance ratio of one means that the
NDC system is in financial balance (i.e. assets and liabilities are equal).
When the balance ratio is below one, the system is in imbalance and
liabilities exceed assets. If the balance ratio exceeds one, the system has
an accumulated surplus. Table 14 -1 shows the financial balance of the NDC
for the period 2001–3.
The automatic balance mechanism is intended to be activated as soon as
the balance ratio falls below one; at that point, indexation of earned
pension rights and current benefits will be lowered from average wage
growth.11 The indexation will be reduced by multiplying the change in
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average wage growth by the balance ratio. The reduced indexation will
continue as long as the balance ratio is less than one. Currently, the
automatic balance mechanism is intended to be applied only in the event
of a system deficit. However, under certain economic and demographic
conditions, the system might build up a permanent and substantial surplus.
In that event, if the surplus becomes too large, the excess would be
distributed to participants; not yet resolved is what might be too large.12
Transition. The transition to the new system is to take place over sixteen
years.13 The first cohort to participate in the system is the 1938 cohort; it is
to receive one-fifth of its benefit from the new system, and four-fifths from
the old system. Each succeeding cohort will then increase its participation
in the new system by 1/20, so that those born in 1944 will receive half of
their benefit from the new and half from the old system.14 Workers born in
1954 or later will participate only in the new system, but not until 2040 will
benefits be paid fully by the new system. In other words, soon after the baby
boom generation has begun to retire in 2015, a large share of benefits will
still be paid by the old system, even though new retirees will get most of
their benefits under the new system.
The Individual Account—the Premium Pension. The new plan also
requires that workers pay 2.5 percent of earnings to a mandatory funded
individual account. These accounts are self-directed and participants may
invest in domestic and international mutual funds. A new government
agency, the Premium Pension Agency (PPM), has been established to
administer the funded pillar and acts as a clearing-house. The clearing-
house model was chosen to keep administrative costs down by drawing on
economies of scale in administration.
Contributions are withheld by employers and submitted to the National
Tax Authority. Swedish employers make monthly tax and contribution
Table 14-1 Assets and Liabilities NDC 2001 and 2002 (Billions of
Swedish Crowns)
2001 2002 2003
Contribution asset 5,085 5,293 5,465
Buffer funds 56 488 577
Total assets 5,650 5,780 6,042
Pension liability 5,423 5,729 5,984
Assets/liabilities 218 52 58
Balance ratio 1.0419 1.0090 1.0097
Note : 1 US$ ¼ 7 Swedish Crowns.
Source : National Social Insurance Board (2004).
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payments, but they report information on individual earnings on an annual
basis. For this reason, individual pension rights cannot be established until
each worker has filed his income taxes; these reports must then be consoli-
dated with employer reports, and the process takes an average of eighteen
months. Until pension rights have been established, pension contributions
are placed on an interim basis in a government bond fund at the National
Debt Office; after individual rights are determined, participants decide
how to invest their funds. Contributions are invested by the PPM in lump
sums; fund companies only know the total investment of pension contri-
butions, not the identity of each individual investor. The PPM keeps all
individual account and fund share value records. Individuals are allowed to
change funds on a daily basis, and all transactions are aggregated by the
PPM which then transmits them as a net purchase or redemption to each
fund.
The Funds. Policymakers decided to offer investors broad choice in the
Premium Pension, so any fund company licensed to do business in Sweden
is allowed to participate in the system. Fund companies seeking to
participate must sign a contract with PPM that governs reporting
requirements and fees. The fee schedule is two-part, involving a money
management fee and a fixed administrative fee charged by the PPM. Fund
managers charge the same fee for participants in the pension system as they
do in the private saving market. Because the account administration is
handled by the PPM, costs for fund managers would be anticipated to be
lower; managers must rebate to the PPM a share of the fees, which PPM
then passes on to participants. The rebate is set by a formula and
determined by the level of the gross fees and the size of the fund;
popular funds and high-fee funds have to pay a larger rebate.
In order to keep the number of funds manageable, each fund manager is
allowed to register a maximum of fifteen funds. At the time of the first
investment elections in 2000, approximately 460 funds were registered with
the PPM (see Table 14 -2). Currently, more than 650 funds participate in
the system. About two-thirds are equity funds, and 6 percent are life cycle
funds (i.e. funds in which the asset allocation automatically changes as
participants approach retirement). About a quarter of the funds invest
mainly in Sweden. Almost 60 percent of the funds were established for
the Premium Pension system. The average gross fund fees (before rebate)
vary from 1.16 percent for the equity funds to 0.47 percent for the funds
that invest only in interest-earning assets. After the rebate, fund fee average
0.43 percent of assets. The fixed administrative fee charged by the PPM is
0.3 percent of assets, resulting in a total cost of 0.73 percent of assets for an
average participant. These administrative costs are relatively high com-
pared to, for example, the US Thrift Savings Plan (the individual account
plan for federal employees): that has expense ratios of 0.1 percent of assets.
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On the other hand, fund costs in Sweden are considerably lower than those
observed in Latin American countries with individual accounts (Mitchell
1998). For example, net fees in Chile were 1.36 percent of assets in 1999
( James et al. 2001).
The government also established two additional funds one being a
default fund for participants who did not choose a fund, and a second
for participants who wanted to make an active choice but also wanted the
government involved in the asset management. In initial discussions, re-
formers suggested that the default would be a low-risk fund mostly invested
in interest-earning assets. But policymakers then worried that such a strat-
egy would have a negative effect on the distribution of benefits, if low-
income workers were more likely to take the default. Consequently, the
default fund’s investment strategy was reformulated to mirror the
asset allocation of an average investor in the system.
Currently the default fund seeks to achieve a high long-run rate of return
at an overall low risk level.15 That fund follows a fixed allocation of stocks
and bonds, where equity holdings cannot exceed 90 percent of the total
value and may not fall below 80 percent; of which a maximum of 75 percent
may be invested in foreign stock. Other funds may invest 100 percent in
equities, but the default must hold a minimum in interest-earning assets.
Currently, the default fund holds 65 percent of its assets in international
equities and 17 percent in Swedish equities; 60 percent of all assets are
managed passively. The money management fee for the default fund is
quite low: in 2003, the gross fee was 0.5 percent, and only 0.16 percent after
the PPM rebate.
The government-managed fund is also required to incorporate environ-
mental and ethical concerns in its investment decisions. Consequently, the
government-managed fund may invest only in companies that follow inter-
national conventions (to which Sweden has agreed) on human rights, child
labor, environment, and corruption. That fund invests in between 2,000
and 2,500 companies worldwide; when in 2001 the firms were screened the
Table 14-2 Distribution of Funds in the Individual Account
System




Balanced equity and interest-earning 10 0.86
Life cycle 6 0.61
Interest-earning 16 0.47
Source : Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh (2003).
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review indicated that thirty companies violated the screen, which were then
excluded from the portfolio.16 It should be noted that the policy only
excludes companies that have violated international conventions, broken
laws, or have admitted wrongdoing. No exclusions are to be made on basis
of the goods that the company produces; for example, tobacco companies
are allowed. Government fund managers do not have voting rights for their
holdings.
Investment Behavior. Participants in the Premium Pension plan may
choose up to five funds. A participant who makes an active investment
choice may not invest any share of the portfolio in the default fund or shift
the portfolio to the default at a later date.17 The first investment election
for the Premium Pension occurred in 2000, and the objective was to induce
as many participants as possible to make an active choice.18 Accordingly,
the agency launched a large advertisement campaign and actively
encouraged participants to select their own portfolios. Private fund
managers also offered ad campaigns to attract investors. At that time,
some two-thirds of participants made an active investment choice,
selecting 3.4 funds on average (see Table 14 -3). The bulk of the
contributions were invested in equities: 74 percent of the portfolios for
men and 69 percent of the portfolios for women were placed in equity
funds. Of course, since life cycle and balanced funds also include equities,
the total share in equities is higher (Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh 2003). Participants
also exhibited ‘home bias’—almost half of the portfolios were invested in
Swedish stocks.
Women were somewhat more likely than men to make a choice, and as
expected, high-income participants were more likely to take an active role
than low-income participants. We caution that one cannot draw firm con-
clusions about the share of participants that actively thought about the
investment decision from these results. This is because no action was
Table 14-3 Investment Allocation, Men and Women, 2000
Men Women
Average amount invested (Swedish crowns) 19,800 15,500
Number of funds elected 3.4 3.4
Average share of portfolio in:
Equity funds 0.74 0.69
Balanced funds 0.07 0.09
Life cycle funds 0.17 0.19
Interest-earning funds 0.02 0.03
Source : Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh (2003).
Note : 1 US$ ¼ 7 Swedish Crowns.
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needed to select the default fund, so one cannot separately identify those
that actively decided that they wanted to invest in the default fund, from
those who defaulted into it through lack of taking action.
One surprise has been that the share of participants actively selecting
their portfolio allocations has fallen considerably, among new system en-
trants. For instance, in 2004, only 9 percent of enrollees selected their own
portfolios. One explanation might be that new entrants are mostly young
workers entering the labor market and far from retirement. Nevertheless, in
the first investment period during 2000, close to 60 percent of participants
in the same age group selected a portfolio instead of defaulting (Cronqvist
and Thaler 2003). One explanation might be that the Premium Pension
received much less attention in more recent enrollment periods: advertising
fell dramatically, as did private fund manager publicity efforts as compared
to the initial election period. Another explanation is that the default fund
performed better than the average portfolio. The initial investment selec-
tions in 2000 coincided with the peak of the run-up in the stock market, and
following that, the stock market tumbled. Since the fall of 2000, the default
fund returned29.9 percent, while the average investor who actively chose
funds lost 39.6 percent of his assets (Cronqvist and Thaler 2003).
Annuities. Benefits in the individual account component can be withdrawn
from age 61 and annuitization is mandatory. The PPM is the sole provider
of funded-system annuities, and participants can select between a fixed or
variable annuity. The level of the annuity is based on standard insurance
practices, and the PPM uses unisex life tables of persons in the age cohort
from the year the calculation is made. The survivor benefit in the funded
component is voluntary. If a survivor benefit is elected and the individual
dies before retirement (during the accumulation phase), the survivor
benefit pays a fixed amount for five years. If the individual dies after
retirement, the survivor benefit will be paid as a lifelong annuity to the
surviving spouse.
Following the pension reform, three of the four occupational schemes
also introduced individual accounts to their workers. Contribution rates in
these schemes vary between 2.5 and 4 percent, which means that most
workers in Sweden now contribute between 5 and 6.5 percent of their
earnings to individual accounts.
Information and Education
Since the reform completely changed the pension scheme, it was crucial to
provide information to participants during the implementation period.
The new system puts more of the risk and responsibility on individuals to
plan for retirement, so in 1998 a broad information campaign was
launched to educate participants about the new system. This campaign
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sent to participants a detailed brochure describing the new system, fielded
numerous public service announcements on radio and television, and
included discussions in newspapers and a website on the reforms. During
the campaign, participants also received their first annual account state-
ment for the pension scheme, the ‘orange envelope’. This orange envelope
is sent out annually and includes account information as well as a projec-
tion of benefits for the NDC as well as the premium pension.
Following the initial campaign, the annual mailing remains the primary
source of information to participants about the pension scheme. It not only
provides information about expected benefits, but it also summarizes how
the new pension system works and promotes the main message that lifetime
earnings determine benefits. For the individual account component, the
PPM also sends out annual information on fund choices, investment risk,
and fees, and the agency has its own website where participants can review
and manage their accounts.
To evaluate the success of information efforts and participant knowledge
about the new pension system, the National Social Insurance Board has
fielded an annual survey since 1999 (National Social Insurance Board 2003).
The most recent survey showed that almost everyone—93 percent of re-
spondents—knew the public pension had been reformed. Furthermore,
about two-thirds of participants say they read at least part of the orange
envelope. Yet when respondents were asked to rate how they perceived their
knowledge about the system, fewer than 40 percent indicated that they had a
good understanding of the new system (Figure 14 -1). About half reported
that they had some understanding of the new system but they viewed their
knowledge as poor. The share of participants who said that they did not
understand the new system at all fell from about 30 percent in 1998 to 13
percent in 2003. Not surprisingly, older individuals were more likely than
younger individuals to report that they had good knowledge of the system.
Men viewed themselves as more knowledgeable than women, and formal
education was positively correlated with system knowledge.
Challenges for the Future
One of the most important objectives of the Swedish pension reform was to
design a pension system that would be financially stable over time, even
when faced with adverse demographic and economic developments. The
new system also seeks to provide increased work incentives and give parti-
cipants a possibility to control some of their pension funds. Next we
investigate whether the reform will achieve its goals, and assess the chal-
lenges for the future.
Financial stability. While the Swedish reform introduced several features to
ensure financial stability, the system is still mainly pay-as-you-go, since
252 Annika Sunde´n
pension payments are financed by annual contributions. Because the
contribution rate in an NDC scheme is fixed by definition, the system’s
financial stability then relies on adjusting benefits. This means that the
system shifts the risk of financing benefits from future to current
generations (Palmer 2002).
The automatic balancing mechanism adjusts benefits immediately, as
soon as the system slips into financial imbalance. It is interesting that the
mechanism does not distinguish between financial imbalances caused by
temporary downturns, from more serious economic and demographic
developments. Thus it is possible that the automatic balancing might be
triggered unnecessarily; the benefit impact of such an event would be
small, but it could have an impact on the system’s political stability. In
fact, when the automatic balancing mechanism was introduced, it was
described as an ‘emergency brake’ that would only be used rarely and
only in situations when the system was in crisis. The result is that when
automatic balancing occurs, it may be taken as a signal that the system is in
crisis and that people’s benefits are threatened. A better strategy might




















Figure 14-1. Self-reported knowledge about the Swedish pension system.
Source : National Social Insurance Board (2003).
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component of the indexation of earned pension rights and benefits. In
general, benefits will grow with average earnings but the return can vary the
same way the rate of return on capital varies. Because automatic balancing
is very likely to occur (the current balance ratio is 1.01), for the system’s
survival it will be important to change the image of the automatic balancing
mechanism.
Benefits. In general, replacement rates will be lower in the new versus the
old pension system. The shift from a DB to a NDC plan makes it difficult to
estimate expected benefits. In fact, only 38 percent of participants in 2003
knew that lifetime contributions determined benefits (National Insurance
Board 2003). Participants also had poor knowledge regarding the benefit
components, and they tended to overestimate the importance of the
Premium Pension for the level of benefits. Benefits will also depend on
the investment decisions in the premium pension and currently
participants’ portfolios are almost entirely invested in equities. The
average investor today is forty-two years old and hence relatively far from
retirement. On the other hand, unless participants reduce their equity
holdings as they approach retirement, market volatility could have a
negative effect on retirement benefits.19
Fairness and Redistribution. The new system creates a close link between
contributions and benefits for many employees, but for those in the
lower half of the wage distribution, this link is broken by the guarantee
pension which is offset by the NDC benefit. For low-wage individuals,
additional work does not necessarily increase pension benefits one-for-
one. The choice of retirement age is also less flexible for retirees
dependent on the guarantee pension, since that benefit is only payable
from age 65. But a high guarantee pension was important to ensure income
security for individuals with no or low earnings. The system also
redistributes income from high earners by putting a ceiling on earnings
used in determining benefits, while levying the employer payroll tax on full
earnings.
The choice to index the system to the change in average wages supple-
mented by an automatic balancing mechanism has implications for the
distribution of benefits between cohorts. The activation of the automatic
balancing mechanism reduces the indexation of earned pension rights and
current benefits by the same amount. Participants in the beginning of their
careers have longer horizons to recoup the loss in benefits compared to
retirees who have started to collect their benefits. The expected size of this
type of redistribution has not yet been fully examined, but some cohorts
are likely to bear a larger share of the burden and may demand to be
compensated.
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Incentives to Work. The retirement age under the new pension is flexible
and the increase in benefits from an additional year’s work is actuarially
fair, which was a design aimed at encouraging incentives to work. Evidence
from the USA supports this view, since they suggest that a DC plan is likely
to increase work among older individuals (see Chapter 5). Furthermore,
the Swedish system does not have an age limit for covered earnings: that is,
participants earn pension credits as long as they work. For example, a
worker could start collecting benefits, and then return to work and
continue earning pension credits. In practice, however, labor market
legislation makes it difficult for workers to continue working past age 67;
further employers are often unwilling to continue employing workers after
age 65. In response to the pension reform, the age limit in labor legislation
was increased to 67, but workers are still not covered by sickness and
unemployment insurance after age 65.
Currently, most workers in Sweden exit the labor market much earlier
than age 67—the average retirement age is approximately 62 (National
Social Insurance Board (NSIB) 2000). Several of the occupational schemes
provide early retirement incentives, and disability insurance has been used
in the past as a path to retirement (Palme and Svensson 1999). As health
improves and life expectancies continues to rise, the relationship between
the ages stipulated by the pension system and labor legislation may have to
be revisited.
Investments Under the Premium Pension System. The individual account
component of the Swedish reform was constructed to provide wide
investment choice. While at first active involvement was encouraged,
more recently the PPM has taken a more passive role and limited its
communication to provide information about fund risks and fees. Its
objective has been to improve public financial knowledge so that workers
can make good investment decisions. The question is whether this strategy
will be successful; the USA experience has shown that investment decisions
are complicated and participants are prone to make mistakes (Munnell
and Sunde´n 2004). Furthermore, participants are not necessarily better off
by choosing their own portfolio from a wide selection of funds (Benartzi
and Thaler 2002). Finally, participants who are dependent on the
guarantee pension have incentives to follow risky investment strategies in
order to try to maximize their Premium Pension benefit because the level
of the guarantee pension is determined by a participant’s earnings-related
benefit if the full contribution went to the NDC.
Members of Parliament and representatives from the PPM and the
default fund have begun discussing the possibility of reducing the number
of fund choices offered. It may be difficult to limit the number of funds
given that the system had started out with broad choice. Another issue is
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whether maintaining such broad choice is cost-efficient. The fixed admin-
istrative fee for the PPM is relatively high, at 0.3 percent of assets (com-
pared to 0.05 percent of assets for the notional accounts), and the money
management fee for the default fund is considerably lower than the ma-
jority of funds.
The experience with the Swedish Premium Pension makes clear the
importance of the default fund. Currently, the fund’s investment strategy
requires that most of the portfolio is invested in equities. Representatives
from the fund have expressed that this strategy needs to be modified and
that life cycle funds should be part of the default’s portfolio. The rule that
once participants have made an active choice, they cannot return to the
default, also needs to be reviewed.
Information and Education. The new system is complicated and surveys
of participants show that knowledge is limited about how the system
function. A majority of participants is unaware of how benefits are
determined, and the notion that the individual account component,
Premium Pension, is more important for retirement income than the
NDC benefit seems to be widespread. At the same time, participants also
report that they need more information. But given the amount of
information currently available, more information is probably not the
solution. A challenge for the NSIB is to consider alternative ways of
communicating with participants.
Conclusions
The Swedish experience with pension reform provides some important
lessons for other countries considering reforming their retirement income
systems. One of the most interesting insights was that Swedish policymakers
recognized pension systems are dynamic institutions and hence must ad-
just to changing demographic and economic circumstances. They also
recognized that it may be politically difficult to make needed adjustments,
or that governments may try to manipulate the pension system for political
gain. They therefore sought to ‘tie politicians’ hands’, by introducing
automatic adjustments that would help insulate the system from political
risk and contribute to maintain its stability. Of course, the NDC approach
implies that all such adjustments involve changes in benefits. Increasing
contributions is not a viable option, because it also increases the benefit
promise. If the system comes under financial pressure, this design feature
could lead to substantial benefit cuts which in turn could threaten retire-
ment income security. Furthermore, the adjustments of benefits in re-
sponse to increasing life expectancy implies that individuals will have to
work longer to reach a given replacement rate. It is always going to be
difficult for some groups, such as those with physically demanding jobs, to
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extend their worklife so these groups may end up with lower replacement
rates than in a system that adjusted benefits as well as taxes. The Swedish
system provides a minimum guaranteed benefit that is well above the
poverty level why adjusting only benefits may be less of a problem than in
countries with lower minimum benefits. For such countries, pension
schemes in which adjustment take place both on the benefit and the
contribution side may be preferable.
The introduction of funded individual accounts was one area of much
disagreement in the reform process. In the end, a small funded pillar with
very broad investment choice was introduced. Participants were encouraged
to choose their own portfolios—in fact, participants were given the impres-
sion that they gave up their opportunity to affect their pension benefits by
investing in the default fund. However, the investment experiences during
the first three years underscore the importance of a well-designed default
fund. The sharp decrease after the initial elections in the share of workers
making an active choice implies that the Swedish system may have too broad
a choice. Another topic of keen interest to countries considering the intro-
duction of individual accounts is whether the clearing-house model will be
cost-effective in the long run. Plan administration requires a well-developed
infrastructure, and plan implementation has been more costly and compli-
cated than anticipated. Finally, it is important to note that funds are not
accessible before age 61, to ensure that they are not used for other purposes
than retirement; further, annuitization is mandatory when the money is
withdrawn.
Overall, the new pension system puts more responsibility on individuals
to plan and prepare for retirement. The system is not perfect: it is compli-
cated and the focus on contributions makes it difficult to predict benefits.
Information and education are important components of the reform but
the Swedish system could be made easier for participants. Finally, although
the pension system is constructed to be financially stable, it does not
solve the financial pressures associated with the retirement of the large
baby boom generation. The transition to the new system was facilitated by
the fact that Sweden had accumulated large reserves in the old system in
order to meet this obligation.
Endnotes
1. The introduction of the public earnings-related scheme primarily affected blue-
collar workers in the private sector, because white-collar workers and employees
in the public sector were already covered by earnings-related benefits through
their occupational schemes. The public earnings-related system was the ‘jewel in
the crown’ for the Social-Democratic party and its introduction was only won
after one of the toughest political fights in modern Swedish history.
2. The Working Group on Pensions was organized along rather unconventional
lines for a Swedish commission. It was headed by the Minister for Health and
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3. Social Insurance and included high-ranking members of the parties repre-
sented in Parliament. However, membership was confined to the parliamentary
political parties; no representatives of labor market organizations or retired
peoples’ associations were included. Although the labor market parties were
not included in the group, a ‘reference group’ consisting of the unions was
continuously briefed on the progress of the group.
3. Following the Swedish reform, several other countries have introduced NDC
schemes including Italy, Poland and Latvia (Palmer 2002).
4. The ceiling is approximately 1½ times the average wage.
5. Credits for child rearing are earned until a child is four years old.
6. After the reform, the system for earnings-related benefits became a separate
system—schemes such as disability insurance that had previously been a part of
the pension system were transferred outside. The calculations of disability
benefits were changed and linked closer to the scheme for sickness benefits.
7. Survivor benefits are provided for outside of the pension system and are
temporary.
8. Currently the buffer funds amounts to about three times’ the annual benefit
payments.
9. The inverse of the turnover duration is the discount rate of the flow of con-
tributions.
10. The calculation of the balance ratio involves only current values and no pro-
jections are made for assets and liabilities. Traditional projections of the finan-
cial status of the pension system are presented in an appendix to the annual
report.
11. To smooth out the effects of temporary downturns, a three-year moving average
is used in the calculation of the balance ratio.
12. During 2004, a government inquiry analyzed the issue. Their task was to
examine the level of the balance ratio at which a distribution can be made
without threatening the system’s financial stability. Of course, it is not likely that
a surplus distribution would occur any time soon; however the reason that the
issue is being decided now is the goal of an autonomous system—future
governments should not be tempted to use the buffer funds for other purposes
than to pay pension benefits.
13. The transition period was originally twenty years but it was shortened because
the reform was delayed.
14. Although individuals born in the late 1940s and early 1950s will get 50 percent
or more of their pension benefits from the new system, many of their decisions
about labor supply (these cohorts have had already been in the workforce for
twenty years or more) and savings were made under the old system. In part for
this reason, the pension rights for the transition cohorts earned in the old
system until 1994 are guaranteed in the event their benefits in the new system is
lower.
15. The five-year return should be in the top quartile of the returns for all funds.
16. The effect on returns was very small. Simulations done by the fund indicates
that the portfolio excluding the thirty companies had a rate of return that was
fifteen basis points lower than the full portfolio.
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17. The reason for this rule was that the center-right parties wanted to limit the
government’s involvement in money management.
18. According to the original time table for the reform, the elections should have
taken place in 1999 but were delayed due to implementation problems of the
computer systems handling the administration.
19. The experience from 401(k) plans in the USA show that participants exhibit
inertia and are not likely to rebalance their portfolios on their own as they age
(Munnell and Sunde´n 2004).
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